The intent of Congress in adapting these The 1985 Farm Bill departs from recent provisions is somewhat difficult to ascertain. farm bills in moving toward more restrictive One objective of limited cross-compliance may acreage control. The change from a two-to a have been to eliminate the creation of "phanfive-year average in calculating base acreage tom acres," acres which are designated for and enforcement of limited cross-compliance conservation use in compliance with program appear to significantly alter crop mix decisions provisions for one crop and then planted in on representative Alabama cotton farms.
t f poa t 90 duction requirement. In such a case, a proUnlike the farm programs of the 1970s ducer might be tempted to elect for nonparwhich allowed price signals to be the primary ticipation in that commodity and plant beyond determinant of acreage, even for farm prothe base, thus exacerbating the existing supgram crops, the 1981 and 1985 Farm Bills limply problem. Limited cross-compliance, howited farm program crop acreage to a portion of ever, provides a disincentive, particularly if an historical average. Although the 1985 Farm program provisions for other commodities are Bill does not represent a radical departure favorable. The five-year base provision may from the 1981 Farm Bill, the 1985 bill is more also have been designed to stabilize supply. restrictive than the 1981 bill. Under the 1981
The objective of this study is to analyze how Farm Bill, a two-year average was used to the change in base acreage calculation and the calculate the program base. The two-year enforcement of limited cross-compliance affect average base, although reducing flexibility producers' farm program participation, crop relative to the previous program, was not mix decisions, and income under the hypotheentirely rigid. To expand base acreage under sis of profit maximization. To accomplish this the 1981 Farm Bill, the producer had only to objective, five-year mixed-integer programforego one or two years of the economically ming models of representative Alabama cotattractive farm program benefits. Under the ton farms were developed. The effects of these 1985 Farm Bill, however, base acreage calcufarm program provisions were tested for the lation uses a five-year average. This makes representative farms. it significantly more difficult for producers Cotton was selected as the commodity of into expand base acreage and modify planting terest for two reasons. First, cotton has long patterns.
been an important farm program commodity The limited cross-compliance provision of in most southern states, and, in Alabama, cotthe 1985 Farm Bill further limits producers' ton typically ranks first among major row abilities to change crop mix. Under limited crops in terms of cash receipts to producers cross-compliance, a producer who opts to par-(Alabama Agricultural Statistical Service). ticipate in the government program for any Secondly, farm program provisions historically one crop may not plant more than the base have had important effects on cotton acreage acreage of any other program crop, even if (Duffy and Knutson) . there is no program participation for the second crop. Farm Analysis Association records, the northMore recently, participation in the farm prowest farm was assumed to have 948 acres suitgram has been designed to increase expected able for row-crops and 56 acres suitable for a income as well as to reduce risk. In most years, cow-calf operation. The farmer was assumed the only benefit from not participating in the to begin with a 492-acre cotton base, a 38-acre farm program would be the opportunity to wheat base, and a 56-acre corn base. Although change planting patterns and increase the base these farms are well above the median for of a profitable crop for increased future proAlabama in acreage, they are representative gram benefits.
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of the commercial size farms in the state. Perry used quadratic programming to anaIn Table 1 , some further assumptions conlyze the participation/crop-mix decision for cerning expected prices and yields for the crop Texas crop farms and found that under the and livestock enterprises are presented. Prices 1981 Farm Bill farmers were willing to exit and yields are the actual 1986 prices and yields the program for one or two years to adjust taken from the Alabama Farm Analysis Assoplanting patterns. The greater the assumed ciation records. degree of risk aversion, the greater the likeliFive-year mixed-integer programming modhood of participation in the farm program. els of the two farms were developed. (For With a five-year base, participation occurred a discussion of integer programming, see every year and no adjustments took place.
McMillan.) A five-year planning horizon, rather than a longer one, was selected for this study ;METHODS because of considerable uncertainty about the Two representative Alabama farms were long-run direction of farm programs. When the created using 1985 and 1986 records from the current farm bill expires, there is no guaranAlabama Farm Analysis Association and 1986 tee that base acreage will still be relevent. A budgets from the Alabama Cooperative Exlonger planning horizon, with an assumed contension Service. Although the representative tinuation of the base acreage provisions of the farms are diversified crop and livestock farms, current Farm Bill, would probably provide inthe primary commodity, as defined by the procreased incentives to expand the bases of the ducers, is cotton. Although cotton is the primore profitable crops. mary commodity of interest in this analysis, it
The models include detailed representation is important to consider cross-commodity imof farm program provisions. The target price/ pacts of the program. In Alabama, most cotdeficiency payment program provides direct ton farms include alternative enterprises, and payments to producers. The total deficiency the interaction of farm program provisions for payment is found by multiplying the per-unit cotton and other commodities can be an imdeficiency payment by proven yield and eliportant determinant of cotton acreage. Begible acreage. In this study, proven yield was cause the wheat, cotton, and corn programs assumed equal to actual yield. Although in any are similar in design, analysis of the cotton given year proven yield may vary consideraprogram in a multi-crop setting is important.
bly from actual yield, their average values One representative farm was developed for would be approximately equal if yields were the central region of Alabama and another for not trending sharply upwards or downwards. the northwest region. Central and northwest (See Stucker and Collins for details of the farm Alabama are the major cotton-producing program.)
Plantings of farm program commodities are that planted and considered planted acreage limited by base acreage and any required acrefor each year prior to the first year of the age reduction. Although a payment limitation analysis was equal to the beginning base. In provision can be enforced in the model, it was the present example, not all of the TBASE-4 not included in this analysis because farmers row is presented due to space limitations. can use legal organization to evade the payThe row TFCOT transfers program and nonment limitation provision (U.S. General Acprogram acreage alike to total yield for calcucounting Office).
lating market receipts. TPCOT transfers Integer variables were used to provide muproven yield from the program acres for caltual exclusivity of participation and nonparculating deficiency payments. An initial defiticipation in the farm program for each eliciency payment on all production is calculated gible crop. Participation vs. nonparticipation in row DEFPAY. (There is a $.2715 per-pound for each crop in each year required a separate cotton deficiency payment in the example.) pair of 0-1 integers. The sum of each pair was This deficiency payment is then divided into constrained to equal one. Thus, only one of DPAYK, which the farm operator keeps, and each set of integers could enter the solution.
DPAYX, which is excess beyond the payment In our study, the assumed objective of the limitation. In this example, there is a $50,000 producers was profit maximization. Thus, the payment limit in effect. To nullify the payproducers were assumed to be risk neutral, ment limit (as has been done in the applicaand participation vs. nonparticipation in the tion), the right-hand side of PAYLIM can be farm program was evaluated solely in terms increased until it is not binding. of expected profits. 1 A risk-averse producer
Other features of the model, not presented would probably be less likely than a riskin Figure 1 , are quarterly cash flow transfers, neutral producer to stay out of the farm prograduated income taxes, and family living exgram for one or more years in the hope of inpenditure as a function of income. In the model, creasing future profits. each year's financial activities are represented A small portion of the central farm model is in four accounting periods. Variable costs are presented in Figure 1 . In this example, there charged to the period in which they are inis a five-year base and no cross-compliance, curred. Borrowing is allowed at a quarterly limited or otherwise. The integer variables rate of three percent, and excess cash can be X-3 and Y-3 represent nonparticipation and invested at two percent quarterly. participation, respectively, in year 3.
Production costs used in the model are from The FAL row prohibits planting outside the 1986 Alabama Cooperative Extension Service program if X-3 is not selected, and PAL proenterprise budgets for the central and northhibits program acreage if Y-3 is not selected.
west regions. For the central farm, fixed costs If X-3 is selected, its coefficient is sufficiently are assumed to be $94,852 per year based on large that FAL is nonbinding and other con-1986 Alabama Farm Analysis Association recstraints in the model (land, labor, etc.) will ords. Of the fixed costs, interest charged to limit nonprogram cotton acreage (AFC). If fixed assets equals $44,865. Annual deprecia-Y-3 is selected, BASEL-3 limits program acretion for machinery and buildings is $35,290. age (APC) to the base (BASE-3). The rows For the northwest farm, fixed costs equal ARP and PLIM divide program acreage into $115,487 per year of which $58,922 is for interplanted acreage (PLAC) and mandatory idled est and $27,875 is for depreciation. Depreciaacreage (ACRP). In this example, 25 percent tion is calculated using the straight-line of the base must be idled.
method to avoid large year-to-year changes in Cotton base in year 4 is calculated in the fixed costs. Fixed costs are charged on an an-TBASE-4 row. It is the average of program nual basis at the end of each year. and nonprogram acreage (APC and AFC) for Progressive federal and state income taxes five years, years 1, 2, and 3 of the model plus are calculated at the end of each year a presumed average from the years before the (Vandeputte and Baker) . Marginal tax rates model begins. In this analysis, it was assumed are from actual 1985 state and federal income 'Empirical evidence indicates that while the hypothesis of risk aversion is valid for some producers, it is not valid for all (Lin et al.; Knowles; Wilson) . Thus, the choice of objective function, strict profit maximization vs. a modification to account for risk, depends on the objective of the study. In this study, we wish to determine, among other things, how changes in the farm program affect the producers' ability to generate income, hence profit maximization was used. tax tables. The operator is assumed to be marin expected prices or yield, might cause the ried, filing a joint return, with two other defarmer to modify the plan. pendents.
The second case is identical to the first exFarm family consumption expenditures are cept that the base acreage is changed from a calculated each year as a portion of after-tax two-to a five-year average. This case is simiincome. A minimum consumption of $10,000 is lar to current farm programs except that limspecified, and a marginal propensity to conited cross-compliance is not enforced. In this sume of .43 (Richardson and Nixon) is used case, the effect of moving from a two-to a for income above this amount. If there is infive-year base is isolated. sufficient income for the minimum consump-
The third case uses a two-year base and limtion, cash may be withdrawn from savings or ited cross-compliance. The purpose of this trial borrowed.
is to analyze how limited cross-compliance The operator is assumed to work full time alone would have affected planting patterns on the farm. Based on Alabama Farm Analywithout the complication of the five-year base. sis Association records, the central farm is asComparison of the results from the second and sumed to have additional unpaid family labor third cases should provide an indication of equivalent to a one-third-time person, and the which provision is most limiting. Finally, northwest farm is assumed to have an addiboth the five-year base and limited crosstional three-fourths-time person. Labor recompliance are added. quirements are specified on a quarterly basis.
Results of these analyses are presented in Additional labor may be hired at $4.50 per Table 2 for the central farm and Table 3 for hour. All employment contracts, whether fullthe northwest farm. The results indicate that or part-time, must run for an entire year.
both the five-year base and the limited crossThe objective function is maximization of compliance provisions have important effects total cash (including investment balances) at on the farm plan. the end of the fifth year. Taxes and family Even under the most flexible alternative consumption are deducted in each year, but (a two-year base and no limited crossopportunity costs of operator time are not incompliance), the central farm is not a profiteluded. Because acreage and machinery valable venture. Net worth decreases by more ues remain fixed throughout the planning hothan $240,000 over the five-year horizon. In rizon, the objective function is equivalent to this analysis, the producer plants as much promaximizing after-tax ending net worth.
gram cotton as allowed in each year (474 acres). By not participating in the wheat pro-RESULTS gram for the first two years, the producer exSeveral policy alternatives were evaluated.
pands the wheat base to 439 acres by year The first case uses the assumptions presented three. Then, in years three through five, there in Table 1 , a two-year base and no crossis program participation for wheat. 4 compliance. This represents a "flexible" alterFor the five-year base with no crossnative to the current farm program provisions compliance on the central farm, the planting concerning acreages of program crops. Target decisions in years one and two are identical to prices, market prices, and production costs are the previous case. In years three through five, held constant in every year of the planning however, wheat acreage is reduced because horizon. In reality, these factors would fluctuthe five-year base calculation results in a ate over time. At the beginning of the plansmaller base. Losses increase to $267,681. The ning horizon, however, future values of these switch from a two-year to a five-year base thus variables are unknown. Results in this analy-"costs" this producer $26,945. sis thus represent the first year of a five-year For the two-year base with limited crossplan that the farmer would begin in the first compliance for the central farm, results are year of the planning horizon. In subsequent dramatically different than for either of years, new information, particularly changes the previous cases. Because limited cross-3In the 1985 Farm Bill, base is the lowest of a two-year or a five-year average. In this paper, we opted to isolate the effects of a pure five-year base. In developing the next farm bill, policy makers may very well consider this option as the five-year base will, by then, have been in effect long enough so that there would be no unanticipated base gains from such a policy. 4 Rotational restrictions are not used in the model because many Alabama farms are not following a rotational system (Touchton et al. compliance prohibits participation in any farm cross-compliance less "costly" to the producer program if one crop is planted beyond the base, than the five-year base. it is not possible to expand the wheat base
The final policy alternative for the central while participating in the cotton program.
farm is a five-year base with limited crossRather than restrict wheat acreage over the compliance. The strategy evaluated is similar five-year horizon, in this case the producer to that employed in the two-year base/limited would opt out of the farm program for one cross-compliance scenario. The entire acreage year and plant the entire acreage in doubleis planted to nonprogram wheat-soybeans in cropped wheat-soybeans. After this, program year one, and subsequent acreages are detercotton and wheat (double-cropped with soymined by the maximum allowable wheat and beans) are planted to the maximum allowed cotton under farm program participation. In under the farm program and single-cropped this case, losses total $290,760, considerably soybeans utilize the remainder of the cropland.
more than in any other policy alternative. Five-year losses now total $257,097, making Interestingly, the full "costs" of switching to a b The base is an arithmetical average of lagged acreage planted and considered planted. For years prior to the beginning of the planning horizon, it was assumed that planted and considered planted acreage equaled the beginning base (Table 1) .
" Farm program payments can be calculated by multiplying planted acres by proven yield (Table 1) and the difference between target price and market price (Table 1) . b The base is an arithmetical average of lagged acreage planted and considered planted. For years prior to the beginning of the planning horizon, it was assumed that planted and considered planted acreage equaled the beginning base (Table 1) .
c Farm program payments can be calculated by multiplying planted acres by proven yield (Table 1) and the difference between target price and market price (Table 1) .
d Represents acreage not in the farm program.
less flexible acreage regime are not captured worth decreases by $10,000 over the five-year by either of the new provisions separately.
horizon. In this scenario, the producer particiCrop mix and program participation decipates in the government programs for cotton, sions on the northwest farm also vary considwheat, and corn in every year of the horizon. erably under the different policy scenarios.
The remaining acreage is planted in soybeans. With a two-year base and no cross-compliance, the strategy is the same as the one selected CONCLUSIONS on the central farm for this policy alternative. Program cotton is planted at the maximum Two provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill were allowable level in all five years. In years one isolated and analyzed: the change from a twoand two, the farmer opts out of the wheat proto a five-year average in calculating base gram and plants all the remaining acreage in acreage and enforcement of limited crossdouble-cropped wheat and soybeans. In years compliance. These provisions profoundly affect three through five, the wheat acreage is enprogram participation decisions, the crop-mix, rolled in the program. Unlike the central farm, and the profitability of two representative the northwest farm is a profitable venture Alabama cotton farms. under this alternative. Net worth increases When the switch from a two-year to a fiveby more than $88,000 in five years. With a year base was made and limited crossfive-year base and no cross-compliance, the compliance was not enforced, the basic stratproducer would still enroll cotton in the proegy of the producers did not change. Profitagram up to the maximum allowed in every bility decreased in each case, however, as the year. Nonprogram wheat would be doubleability to expand the base of desirable procropped with soybeans for four years, and program crops was reduced. On the other hand, gram wheat would be double-cropped with soyadding limited cross-compliance to the twobeans in year five. This strategy is somewhat year base models resulted in a complete change different from that employed on the central of strategy on both farms. Limited crossfarm for the same policy alternative. In this compliance also resulted in decreased income. alternative, net worth increases by about When both limited cross-compliance and the $77,500 over the five-year horizon. Thus, there five-year base were used, profitability deis about a $9,500 decline in ending net worth creased considerably. Thus, the "costs" of caused by switching from a two-year to a fiveswitching to a less-flexible program are not year base.
adequately captured by either component When the two-year base is combined with separately. On the central farm, the crosslimited cross-compliance, the northwest farm compliance/five-year base strategy was simiemploys a strikingly different cropping patlar to the cross-compliance/two-year base tern than previously noted. In the first year strategy. On the northwest farm, however, an of the planning horizon, all crop acreage is entirely different strategy was chosen. planted in nonprogram cotton. Cotton acreage This paper has demonstrated that these two in years two through five is the maximum alprovisions have extremely important conselowed by the program. (The base fluctuates quences for cotton farms. It should also be somewhat because it is a moving average.) noted that on one of the two farms analyzed, Program wheat double-cropped with soybeans even the combination of limited crossis the maximum allowed in years two through compliance and a five-year base did not result five, as is program corn. The remaining acrein the farmer simply staying with his or her age is allocated to single-cropped soybeans.
given bases in every year. Thus, these requireIn this case, ending net worth increases by ments may not be entirely effective in "fixabout $50,000, a $38,000 decline from the case ing" future farm program acreages. Policy in which there was a two-year base and no makers should consider whether the loss in cross-compliance. The limited cross-compliance farmer flexibility is compensated for by a more provision alone is thus more "costly" to this stable supply. This type of question may be farm than the change to the five-year base. best answered using industry-level models. In When both a five-year base and limited addition, such models might be used to adcross-compliance are enforced, the profitabildress the issue of resource use (or misuse) ity of the farm is completely eroded and net under the alternative provisions.
